Highlights:
– Privacy vs. Compliance: The use of Signal-like encrypted messaging apps by officials raises concerns about balancing privacy features with legal record-keeping requirements, prompting a debate on the challenges faced in official communications.
– Security Risks and Compliance: The incident sheds light on the security risks posed by third-party messaging platforms in handling classified information, underscoring the importance of strict adherence to secure communication protocols and oversight of messaging tools used by high-ranking personnel.
– Debate on Transparency and Cybersecurity: The fallout from the controversy sparks a broader conversation on transparency, cybersecurity culture, and the vulnerabilities commercial messaging applications may introduce to high-level government communications.
Summary
Michael Waltz, who served as National Security Advisor under the Trump administration in early 2025, came under scrutiny after being photographed using a messaging application resembling Signal during a White House cabinet meeting just one day before his ouster. Signal is a widely used encrypted messaging app known for end-to-end encryption and disappearing messages, features that enhance privacy but pose challenges for federal record-keeping requirements. Waltz’s use of a modified version of Signal, developed by an Israeli company to include message archiving functionality, sparked controversy over compliance with legal mandates to preserve official government communications.
The controversy deepened when reports revealed that Waltz and his team extensively used this Signal-like app to coordinate sensitive discussions on topics such as Ukraine, China, and Gaza, including in numerous group chats that inadvertently involved unauthorized participants, raising significant security concerns and prompting questions about the app’s suitability for handling classified information. The National Security Agency (NSA) had previously warned government employees about vulnerabilities in Signal, leading to restricted use on White House-issued devices. Critics argued that the reliance on third-party messaging platforms outside official secure systems undermined operational security and violated federal record retention laws.
The incident contributed to internal tensions within the White House, damaging Waltz’s standing and precipitating a broader shakeup of the national security team. Despite initial defenses by White House officials affirming the app’s approval for government use, the episode highlighted ongoing challenges in balancing modern encrypted communication technologies with the legal and security requirements of government operations. The fallout sparked a wider debate over transparency, cybersecurity culture, and the risks posed by commercial messaging applications in high-level government communications.
In the aftermath, the White House pledged to implement measures to prevent similar breaches, underscoring the need for stricter adherence to secure communication protocols and better oversight of messaging tools used by senior officials. The Waltz controversy has become emblematic of broader national security and policy challenges associated with encrypted messaging apps in government, raising enduring questions about how to reconcile privacy, security, and public accountability in official communications.
Background
Michael Waltz, a former Army Special Forces soldier and representative for Florida’s 6th congressional district from 2019 to 2025, was appointed as national security advisor in January during the Trump administration. In March 2025, Waltz was photographed during a White House cabinet meeting using a messaging application that closely resembled Signal, an encrypted messaging app known for its strong privacy features such as end-to-end encryption and the ability to automatically delete messages.
Signal, founded in 2012 and operated by the non-profit Signal Foundation, is widely used by journalists, activists, and national security professionals due to its open-source code and robust encryption that protects messages from interception or cyberattacks. However, concerns arose regarding compliance with federal record-keeping laws, as official government communications must be preserved, and use of private encrypted apps without proper archiving may violate these regulations.
Further scrutiny revealed that Waltz was not using the standard Signal app but rather a modified version developed by an Israeli company, known as TM SGNL, which includes functionality to archive and store messages for record-keeping purposes. This adaptation appeared to address legal requirements for preserving presidential records, a challenge since traditional Signal automatically deletes messages and does not retain data by default.
Despite warnings against using third-party encrypted apps for official business, the use of Signal and similar platforms has become common among various government officials for secure communications, especially given concerns about the security of other government communication systems. The White House acknowledged efforts to rectify the situation after the incident, emphasizing steps taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.
Waltz’s use of the Signal-like app and the resulting controversy coincided with a period of internal White House tensions and cabinet reshuffling. Critics cited Waltz’s hawkish foreign policy stance and challenges in inter-agency coordination as additional factors contributing to his ouster shortly after the photograph surfaced. Nonetheless, White House officials defended the app’s use, with the White House Communications Director stating that Signal was an approved application installed on government phones.
Events Leading to the Ouster
In the days preceding his removal as National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz and his team heavily utilized a modified version of the Signal messaging app to coordinate sensitive government communications, including war planning and foreign policy discussions. This usage included at least 20 Signal group chats focused on topics such as Ukraine, China, and Gaza, where officials repeatedly exchanged sensitive information. Notably, these chats inadvertently included unauthorized participants, such as a journalist and family members of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, leading to significant security concerns and intelligence breaches outside of the secure government communication channels typically used for classified operations.
The reliance on Signal, despite its end-to-end encryption, raised questions about the app’s security and appropriateness for handling highly sensitive government matters. While the app’s strong encryption makes it attractive for confidential communication, its features—such as disappearing messages—pose challenges for official record-keeping, as preserving presidential records is a legal requirement. Moreover, the app was flagged by the National Security Agency in February 2025 for potential vulnerabilities, and government officials were advised to use it sparingly on White House-issued devices during the subsequent administration.
Amid growing scrutiny, the White House acknowledged efforts to prevent future security lapses related to the app’s use. Press secretary Karoline Leavit stated that steps were underway to ensure such incidents would not recur. Nonetheless, the controversy fueled criticism from Congressional Democrats demanding greater accountability and reforms to government communications policies.
The ouster itself was part of a broader shake-up within the Trump administration’s national security team. Reports indicated that Waltz’s deputy, Asia expert Alex Wong, was also forced out around the same time. The rapid nature of these personnel changes caught even State Department officials by surprise. Taken together, the security concerns arising from Waltz’s use of the Signal-like app and the ensuing public and political backlash contributed significantly to the circumstances leading to his removal as National Security Advisor.
Use of Signal-like App at the White House
White House officials, including Mike Waltz during his tenure as National Security Advisor, have been reported to use a modified version of the Signal messaging app for official communications. This version, developed by a company called TeleMessage, appears to be a clone of the original Signal app but with added archiving capabilities to comply with legal requirements for presidential records preservation. Unlike the standard Signal app—which uses end-to-end encryption and supports features like message deletion—the TeleMessage variant enables messages to be stored and later retrieved, raising concerns about the privacy and security guarantees traditionally associated with Signal.
The use of Signal and its modified versions by government officials has been a subject of controversy. While Signal itself is an open-source application praised for its strong encryption and security features, its usage in official government communication has been cautioned against due to risks such as vulnerabilities identified by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the potential for unauthorized data exfiltration when messages are linked to desktop applications. The NSA issued a special security bulletin warning employees about vulnerabilities in the Signal app in early 2025, underscoring these concerns.
Within the Biden administration, Signal was permitted on White House-issued phones but was recommended for limited use by authorized personnel, primarily for organizing sensitive meetings. However, the Pentagon’s internal watchdog had previously criticized the use of Signal by a former official in 2021, citing breaches of records retention policies and unauthorized communication of sensitive information. Despite official discouragement, Signal has become widely used among various government officials for sensitive organizational correspondence, including discussions on topics such as Ukraine, China, and Gaza.
The modified Signal app’s archiving functionality was seen as a possible solution to the conflict between secure messaging and the federal requirement to preserve official records, as disappearing messages inherently complicate record retention efforts. Yet, this solution introduces new risks; app developers like Signal are protective of their secure implementations and warn that unofficial versions may compromise encryption and privacy. A Signal spokesperson emphasized that the privacy and security properties of unofficial versions cannot be guaranteed.
The exposure of Waltz’s use of the TeleMessage-based Signal clone raised questions about the classification and security of the information shared on the platform, especially as reports indicated the creation of numerous Signal group chats among senior officials for official work coordination. Some photographs even showed Waltz using Signal to communicate with other cabinet members, confirming the app’s approval on government phones, as stated by the White House communications director.
The controversy surrounding the use of Signal-like apps also highlighted legal concerns. Under federal records laws, text messages regarding official acts must be preserved, and government employees are prohibited from using messaging applications like Signal for official business unless the messages are forwarded to an official account. Critics argue that the use of encrypted and disappearing-message apps conflicts with these laws designed to maintain historical records and public transparency. The White House acknowledged the need to address these issues and indicated steps have been taken to prevent similar problems in the future.
Security and Policy Implications
The use of Signal and Signal-like messaging apps by government officials, including senior national security personnel, has raised significant security and policy concerns. While Signal employs end-to-end encryption and is open source—features that generally enhance privacy and security—its use within government circles has not been without controversy and risk.
One major issue is that these apps have been utilized outside the established secure government communication channels designed for classified or highly sensitive information, such as JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System). This departure from protocol has led to multiple intelligence breaches, undermining operational security and raising questions about the wisdom of using such third-party apps for official business. For example, Signal chats among Cabinet members discussing military operations have sparked alarm, especially given that such communications were sometimes conducted on personal devices, which are more vulnerable to hacking by foreign adversaries.
Government policy explicitly restricts the use of third-party messaging apps like Signal for handling nonpublic unclassified information or official business unless messages are archived appropriately. Federal records laws require that communications about official acts be preserved; failure to forward or copy such messages to official government accounts potentially constitutes a violation of these laws. In practice, this has proven challenging, as officials sometimes use apps like Signal to discuss sensitive topics, such as military strike planning, outside the government’s official systems.
The Biden administration reportedly limited the use of Signal on White House-issued phones, instructing users to employ the app sparingly, reflecting concerns about its vulnerabilities despite its encryption standards. The National Security Agency also issued operational security bulletins warning employees of potential weaknesses in Signal, highlighting that even apps with strong encryption can be compromised or exploited, especially on personal devices.
Moreover, Signal-like apps that resemble Signal but implement their own versions of encryption or data handling have introduced additional risks. Some of these modified applications reportedly exfiltrate data to external machines, undermining the security guarantees typically associated with Signal’s open-source protocol. This raises concerns about the reliability and security of government-endorsed communication tools that are not fully transparent or independently verified.
The incidents involving the use of Signal and similar apps have not only compromised operational security but also highlighted broader issues within national security management. For instance, the accidental inclusion of a media editor in a private Signal chat about a sensitive bombing campaign was emblematic of both the technological risks and gaps in personnel expertise within the National Security Council and related bodies. Such breaches have damaged reputations and underscored the need for more stringent adherence to secure communication protocols and improved cybersecurity culture within the government.
Political and Personnel Repercussions
The revelation that National Security Adviser Mike Waltz used a modified version of the Signal messaging app to communicate sensitive information sparked significant political controversy and personnel consequences within the White House. The incident exposed vulnerabilities in the handling of classified information, raising concerns about the use of personal devices and third-party applications by senior officials for government communications.
White House officials initially defended Waltz’s use of Signal, stating that the app was approved and installed on government phones, with Communications Director Steven Cheung emphasizing its official status in response to criticism. Nonetheless, the inadvertent inclusion of The Atlantic’s editor Jeffrey Goldberg in a confidential group chat detailing U.S. military operations against Houthi militants in Yemen caused widespread alarm and damaged Waltz’s standing within the administration.
The fallout from the incident contributed to a broader shakeup within the White House staff, with sources indicating that Waltz’s handling of information and relationships with other officials had become increasingly problematic. An official remarked that the event “badly damaged Waltz” and noted that he was advised to adopt a more deferential approach toward senior staffers such as Wiles. These tensions occurred amid ongoing concerns about staff turnover and the challenge of maintaining cohesive security strategies, especially within the National Security Council, which plays a critical role in coordinating U.S. security policy.
In the wake of the scandal, the White House pledged to implement measures to prevent similar incidents from occurring, with press secretary Karoline Leavit stating that steps were being taken to ensure that such a breach “can obviously never happen again”. Despite these assurances, data security experts highlighted the broader implications for national security, warning that reliance on commercial messaging platforms—even modified versions—posed significant risks, especially when used on personal devices by officials managing classified information.
The controversy also had political ramifications beyond personnel changes. It sparked a debate over transparency and accountability within the Trump administration, with shifting and sometimes contradictory explanations offered by senior officials about the episode. Some observers noted that President Trump appeared more upset about the inclusion of a liberal journalist in the confidential chat than the exposure of sensitive intelligence to foreign adversaries. This dynamic further complicated the administration’s efforts to manage the fallout and maintain control over national security communications.
Ultimately, the incident involving Waltz’s use of a Signal-like app and the resulting breach contributed to the erosion of confidence in his leadership, preceding his ouster as National Security Adviser shortly after the 100-day mark of the administration’s second term. The episode underscored the challenges facing the White House in balancing secure communication protocols with the practicalities of modern technology use among high-level officials.
Aftermath and Broader Context
The use of an encrypted messaging app resembling Signal by National Security Adviser Michael Waltz in White House communications sparked considerable controversy and scrutiny. The White House acknowledged the incident and indicated efforts to prevent a recurrence, with press secretary Karoline Leavit stating that steps have been taken to ensure such a situation “can obviously never happen again” as the administration moves forward. Despite these assurances, the episode damaged Waltz’s standing; a government official remarked that the adviser was admonished to be more deferential following the incident, underscoring the internal repercussions he faced.
The revelation that Waltz was using a modified version of Signal to communicate with senior officials—including the secretary of state and the director of national intelligence—raised questions about the appropriateness and security of such platforms for official business. This was especially concerning given that Signal, while popular for its end-to-end encryption, is fundamentally a commercial messaging application not designed for classified government communications. The Pentagon’s internal watchdog subsequently launched an investigation into the use of commercial apps like Signal by officials such as Hegseth, highlighting the gravity of potential security breaches.
Signal’s widespread use among government personnel persists despite official warnings about its vulnerabilities. Encrypted messaging apps have grown increasingly popular for scheduling sensitive meetings and internal correspondence, often even being registered to personal phone numbers rather than government-issued devices. However, the Department of Defense issued a memo cautioning employees against using Signal for information that is not already public, citing risks such as malware, vulnerabilities, and potential unauthorized access by foreign adversaries. This caution reflects broader concerns about data security within federal agencies, as experts have expressed alarm that government officials frequently bypass the
The content is provided by Sierra Knightley, Front Signals
